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It may be argued that the rationale of the California and the Massachusetts
courts has unduly enlarged the scope of the injunction and may lead to abuse
as in the early history of labor law. Although use of the injunction deprives the
defendant of a jury trial, and although punishment for contempt is sadly lacking
in definite standards, the scope of injunctive relief should not be restricted by
an arbitrary distinction between property rights and personal rights in an important and growing class of cases where such relief is often the sole remedy.
The other criteria for equitable relief, if adhered to, provide adequate safeguards
against abuse. In the instant case-a substantial right was clearly threatened.
The asked-for relief was practicable and endangered no constitutional freedoms.
The remedy at law could not adequately recompense the plaintiff for the mental
injury suffered in being ejected from the turf club.
The holding of the California Court that personal rights in proper cases are
entitled to the protection of equity in view of the inappropriate nature of the
remedy at law provides an important precedent in cases involving discrimination against minority groups.

ENFORCEABLE OBLIGATION AS REQUIREMENT
FOR VALID TRUST
The plaintiff executed a trust deed conveying real property to himself as
trustee for the benefit of his wife and children. As trustee he had full discretion
over the use and disposition of the property, including the privilege of reconveying the property to himself personally after his youngest child reached the
age of twenty-one. The beneficiaries were to enjoy only such benefits as he chose
to confer on them at his discretion. Subsequently, a divorce decree awarded
part of the real property involved in the trust deed to the plaintiff's wife. The
plaintiff brought an action to quiet title in himself as trustee, claiming that the
court in the divorce action lacked jurisdiction over the property because the
trustee was not before the court. Because the trust deed imposed no enforceable
obligation on the trustee and gave him absolute and unconditional discretion
with respect to the property, it was held that it was invalid, and that no trust
was created. Ponzelino v. Ponzelino.'
A valid trust requires a division of the interests in the trust property between
a trustee, who usually holds legal title, and one.or more beneficiaries, whose interests in the property, under the trust instrument, are enforceable by a court of
pressed by the plaintiff's suggestion that if equity would safeguard their right to sell bananas

it ought to be at least equally solicitous of their personal liberties guaranteed by the Constitution. We believe the true rule to be that equity will protect personal rights by injunction upon
the same conditions upon which it will protect property rights by injunction ..... "Kenyon v.
City of Chicopee, 70 N.E. 2d 241, 244 (Mass., 1946).
1 26 N.W. 2d 330 (Iowa, 1947).

RECENT CASES

equity.2 Even where the requirements as to certainty of the beneficiaries3 and
s
subject matter 4 are met, and the intention to establish a trust is clear the
absence of words imposing an enforceable duty upon the trustee will cause the
6
trust to fail.
However, the line of demarcation between words which create an enforceable
obligation and those which do not is not well defined. Discretionary powers in
the trustee are not in themselves indicative of the absence of enforceable obligations.7 A trustee's discretion to designate who and how much any one of a class
of beneficiaries will receive will not cause a trust to fail. 8 Nor will his discretion
as to the use of the trust property and the allowances made to the beneficiaries
in a spendthrift trust lead to the conclusion that his duties are unenforceable.9
But a court will not enforce a trust which the trustee is to administer according
to secret instructions which he may not divulge,"' and the mere designation of a
party as "trustee," or of the property as left "in trust," will not suffice to impose
the necessary obligation upon the trustee.":
In those cases in which the settlor makes himself trustee, he cannot assert the
existence of an enforceable obligation, so as to defeat other claims against the
trust property, where the enforceable interests of beneficiaries are so remote or
illusory as to give the trustee immediate control, tantamount to full ownership,
over the use and disposition of the property and the income therefrom."2 Where,
as in the instant case, the settlor-trustee failed to include words showing that the
discretionary powers of the trustee were limited by enforceable obligations, the
trust also fails.'3 Thus it appears that an enforceable obligation is found only
where the words creating the trust clearly indicate some purpose for which the
2 1 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § i (i935).
3Seran v. Davis, 174 Okla. 433, 50 P. 2d 662 (1935); Hodgson v. Dorsey, 230 Iowa 730,
In re Perkins' Will, 68 N.Y. Misc. 255, 124 N.Y. Supp. 998 (IgIO);
Tilden v. Green, i3o N.Y. 29, 28 N.E. 88o (i8gi).
4 Glover v. Baker, 76 N.H. 393, 83 Atl. 916 (1912); i Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § iii
(I935); I Rest., Trusts § 66 (1935).
5Deakins v. Webb, 19 Tenn. App. 182, 84 S.W. 2d 367 (1935); Burns v. Nolette, 83 N.H.
489, x44 AtI. 848 (1929); In re Newark Shoe Stores, 3 F. Supp. 293 (Md., 1933); 1 Rest.,
Trusts § 23 (1935)6 1 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § i (1935).
298 N.W. 895 (194I);

7Whelan v. Reilly, 3 W. Va. 597 (1869). See 1, 3 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees §§ 221, 560

(1935).
9Moskowitz v. Federman, 72 Ohio App. 149, 5i N.E. 2d 48 (x943); In re Dewey's Estate,
45 Utah 98, r43 Pac. 124 (194); 1 Rest., Trusts § I2I (935).
9Sheridan v. Krause, 16i Va. 873, 172 S.E. 5o8 (1934).
10Sibenaler v. Weiderholt, 54 Okla. 16, 153 Pac. 683 (1915). But see James v. Joseph, 156
Tenn. 417, 1 S.W. 2d 1017 (1928).

it In re Tunnell's Estate, 325 Pa. 554, 19o Atl. 9o6 (1937); Dunn v. Ponceler, 230 Ala. 375,
161 So. 450 (1935); Lossie v. Central Trust Co., 219 Ky. I, 292 S.W. 338 (1927).
1 Morsman v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 90 F. 2d 18 (C.C.A. 8th, 1937); Board
of Directors of Theological Seminary v. Lowrance, 126 S.C. 89, iig S.E. 383 (1923).
13Gueutal v. Gueutal, 113 App. Div. 3:o, 98 N.Y. Supp. 1002 (:9o6).
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trust is to be administered, which is beneficial to a party other than the trustee,
and which is sufficiently definite to form the basis of a beneficiary's suit to compel specific performance by the trustee.
These criteria of an enforceable obligation, however, frequently work hardships, especially in those cases in which a testator has died with the belief,
usually written into the will, that the devisee will provide for other designated
individuals.4 In such a case, the failure of a court to find a trust relationship
results in the violation of the testator's intent if the devisee does not fulfill his
moral obligation. This result seems especially harsh in view of the fact that the
weight of authority indicates that the testator's insertion of a few words to the
effect that the devisee was to use the property for the care and maintenance,'5
or for the education 6 of the non-inheriting survivors, would operate to establish an enforceable trust.
Nevertheless, the general rule requiring an enforceable obligation in a trust
relation seems desirable in that it spares the courts the burdensome problem of
defining moral obligations in concrete, pecuniary terms which are enforceable.
Furthermore, as applied in the Ponzelino case, the rule effectively bars the creation of mock legal entities and relationships which can be used to insure a
property owner the full beneficial use of his property, while putting it beyond
the grasp of creditors and tax collectors.

DISCHARGE FOR DUAL UNIONISM UNDER
THE WAGNER ACT
On April r the CIO petitioned the National Labor Relations Board for investigation and certification of representation at the respondent's plant. A prior
closed-shop contract between the AFL and the respondent automatically renewed itself for an additional year on May 3. On June 23 the Board held an
election' among the respondent's employees at which the AFL was chosen over
the CIO as majority representative. Thereafter, an employee who had served
as an observer for the CIO at the election was expelled from the AFL for his
activities in promoting the rival union. At the demand of the AFL, and pursuant to the existing closed-shop contract, the respondent, with full knowledge
Z4Annis v. Huggins, 35 S.D. 3oo, 152 N.W. 14 (x915); Axtell v. Coons, 82 Fla. x58, 89 So.
419 (i92i); Floyd v. Smith, 59 Fla. 485, 5i So. 537 (igio). Cf. Braubakerv.Lauver, 322 Pa.
46r, i85 Atl. 848 (1936); Bliss v. Bliss, 2o Idaho 467, ri9 Pac. 451 (i911).
'5 Colton v. Colton, 127 U.S. 3oo (1888); Burke v. Burke, 259 I1. 262, 102 N.E. 293 (1913);
Gibson v. Gibson, 25 Ky. X332, 77 S.W. 928 (1904).
16Parks v. Lefeber, 162 Okla. 265, 20 P. 2d 179 (i933); Hill v.,Clark, 74 Pa. Super. Ct. 181
(1920); Mackenzie v. Los Angeles Trust & Savings Bank, 39 Cal. App. 247,178 Pac. 557 (1919);
Hoyt v. Bliss, 93 Conn. 344, io5 Atl. 699 (i919).

The CIO had given timely notice of its representation claim, and the Board did not consider the contract a bar to representation proceedings. Cf. Matter of American Woolen Mills,
57 N.L.R.B. 647 (1944).

